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Social threat indirectly increases 
moral condemnation via thwarting 
fundamental social needs
Robert K. Henderson* & Simone Schnall
Individuals who experience threats to their social needs may attempt to avert further harm by 
condemning wrongdoers more severely. Three pre-registered studies tested whether threatened 
social esteem is associated with increased moral condemnation. In Study 1 (N = 381) participants 
played a game in which they were socially included or excluded and then evaluated the actions of 
moral wrongdoers. We observed an indirect effect: Exclusion increased social needs-threat, which 
in turn increased moral condemnation. Study 2 (N = 428) was a direct replication, and also showed 
this indirect effect. Both studies demonstrated the effect across five moral foundations, and was 
most pronounced for harm violations. Study 3 (N = 102) examined dispositional concerns about social 
needs threat, namely social anxiety, and showed a positive correlation between this trait and moral 
judgments. Overall, results suggest threatened social standing is linked to moral condemnation, 
presumably because moral wrongdoers pose a further threat when one’s ability to cope is already 
compromised.
Loss of social connections is a perpetual risk when interacting with others. Indeed, it has been suggested that 
people possess an internal ‘sociometer’ that tracks self-esteem relating to one’s social position amongst  peers1,2. 
Threats to self-esteem are associated with feeling foolish, awkward, and inadequate, indicating that self-esteem 
may be a proxy for the appreciation that individuals believe others feel towards them. Further evidence suggests 
that the sociometer monitors the social environment for cues indicating social acceptance, and, when such cues 
are absent, individuals subsequently experience negative affect, such as social  anxiety2,3. Sensitivity to social 
disapproval exists even in brief interactions with strangers that one will never meet face-to-face2,4,5. If individuals 
experience threats to their social needs—namely, social threat—then these adaptive mechanisms monitor the 
environment for information relevant to restoring such  needs6.
In fact, Dickerson and  Kemeny7 proposed a ‘social self-preservation system’ that continually scans the envi-
ronment for potential threats to social standing. In a meta-analysis of 208 studies on cortisol responses to stress-
ful situations they found that tasks with the potential for negative social evaluation (e.g., delivering a speech) 
resulted in cortisol levels more than three times higher than non-social stressful tasks (e.g., mental arithmetic). 
They conclude that individuals may be equally concerned with preserving their social needs as their physical 
safety, because cortisol rises to recruit physiological energy for a fight or flight response in the face both social 
and physical threats.
We propose that thwarted social needs—that is, heightened social threat—fortifies moral judgments across 
moral domains, rather than a single domain (e.g., fairness). This is consistent with error management, such that 
if an individual is in a heightened state of danger as a consequence of social exclusion, the more costly error is to 
be under-vigilant about some sinister acts than to be over-vigilant for  others8. That is, individuals who experi-
ence social threat may condemn wrongdoers more harshly regardless of moral domain, because underestimating 
the potential threat from a transgressor of any kind could be particularly costly when one’s social needs have 
been undermined. In line with the proposed social monitoring and social self-preservation systems, research 
has shown that social exclusion (vs. inclusion) is associated with bolstered memory for social  information9, 
greater attention to others’ vocal  tones10, improved ability to distinguish authentic from inauthentic  emotions11 
and increased aptitude for detecting  deception12. Thus, social threat can enhance the capacity to identify further 
sources of potential threat—especially in social contexts.
Furthermore, socially threatened individuals shift towards a “prevention focus,” in which they aim to mini-
mize dangers and risks, as opposed a “promotion focus,” aimed at taking risks to cultivate positive  outcomes13. 
That is, individuals who reported experiencing chronic loneliness and participants who experienced social 
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exclusion in lab settings were more cautious, relative to those who reported greater social connection. Further-
more, a meta-analysis indicated that individuals who were more concerned with safety and security relative to 
growth and advancement made stronger affect-based, deontological judgments in response to moral  dilemmas14. 
Conversely, individuals who report stronger social bonds subsequently made less affect-laden, more utilitarian 
moral  judgments15. Relatedly, the neural substrates involved in utilitarian moral judgments appear to overlap with 
brain regions associated with risky decision-making16. Taken together, these findings suggest that when people 
feel safe, they may be willing to take on more risk. In contrast, when individuals experience threat, they might 
then become more cautious. Based on this existing research, we therefore propose that social threat should be 
linked to moral condemnation, such that relative to feeling socially secure, experiencing social threat will give 
rise to harsher judgments of moral wrongdoing.
Study 1
The first pre-registered study used the classic Cyberball  procedure4,5 to examine whether social threat increases 
moral disapproval. Participants rated their disapproval of moral violations, drawn from Moral Foundations 
 Theory17, which proposes that morality is an “interlocking set of values, practices, institutions, and evolved psy-
chological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible” and 
posits at least five moral foundations: Dislike for suffering of others (Harm), concern with cheating and lack of 
reciprocity (Fairness), group adherence (Loyalty), deference to leadership and tradition (Authority), and concern 
with purity and contamination (Sanctity). These five foundations are thought to have arisen to cope with adaptive 
challenges in human ancestral environments. Based on results from a pilot study (see supplement), we predicted 
stronger effects for harm violations. All studies were approved by the University of Cambridge’s Department of 
Psychology Ethics Committee and participants in each study gave their informed consent beforehand. All studies 
were performed in accordance with relevant guidelines and regulations.
Methods. Participants. Participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were re-
quired to have completed at least 100 tasks, hold a task approval rating of at least 95%, and reside in the U.S. 
Informed by results from a pilot study in which we detected a suggestive effect of d = 0.24 for harm violations, a 
G*Power  analysis18 indicated a sample size of 432 for a between-subjects design with 80% power at α = 0.05 to 
obtain such an effect. Data were collected from 445 participants in anticipation of some participants not comply-
ing with instructions. We excluded eight for failing to provide consent prior to the start of the task, and fifty-six 
for incorrect responses to both of the two manipulation check items. No other participants were excluded. The 
final sample comprised 381 participants (169 women; age: M = 37.11 years, SD = 11.77). The inclusion condition 
had 80 women and 101 men (age: M = 37.51 years, SD = 12.20) and the exclusion condition had 89 women and 
111 men (age: M = 36.75 years, SD = 11.39).
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to either the inclusion or exclusion condition in the Cyber-
ball  procedure4,5, which was introduced as a computer game involving a mental visualization task. Participants 
controlled a cartoon character and took turns throwing a ball with two other “players” (digital confederates). 
They were instructed to mentally visualize the game and imagine they were playing the game “in real life.” In the 
inclusion condition the two other “players” frequently threw the ball to the participant whereas in the exclusion 
condition they almost exclusively passed the ball only between themselves. Next, participants responded to 60 
Moral Foundations Vignettes that had been pre-tested and  standardized19. There were 12 violations for each 
foundation, rated on a scale from 1 (not at all wrong) to 5 (extremely wrong). Scenarios included, “You see a 
girl laughing when she realizes her friend’s dad is the janitor” (Harm), “You see a tenant bribing a landlord to be 
the first to get their apartment repainted” (Fairness), “You see a man leaving his family business to go work for 
their main competitor” (Loyalty), “You see a star player ignoring her coach’s order to come to the bench during 
a game” (Authority), and “You see a girl and her sister making out with each other just for practice.” (Sanctity). 
Vignettes were administered in a randomized order.
Though not pre-registered in this study, as an exploratory measure participants then reported their level 
of fundamental social needs using a well-established measure commonly used with the Cyberball  paradigm4 
that covers feelings of belonging, self-esteem, meaningful existence and sense of control experienced during 
the Cyberball game. There were 20 items in total, rated on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much so). Items 
included “I felt rejected” (belonging), “I felt insecure” (self-esteem), “I felt invisible” (meaningful existence), and “I 
felt the other players decided everything” (sense of control). As a manipulation check, participants estimated how 
many times they received the ball, and whether they were included as much as the other players in the game. On 
an exploratory basis they then completed a brief personality inventory to test whether Big Five personality traits 
may serve as moderators (see analyses in the online supplement). Then they were debriefed and compensated.
The pre-registration is here: http:// aspre dicted. org/ blind. php?x= pu9xy2. We report all measures, manipula-
tions and exclusions.
Results. Confirmatory analyses. Manipulation check. As expected, socially  included participants 
reported a higher percentage of throws they received (M = 37%, 95% CI = [36%, 38%]) than excluded partici-
pants (M = 15%, 95% CI = [13%, 16%]), t(379) =  − 26.69, p < 0.001. Additionally, they accurately reported more 
inclusion in the game (M = 5.21, 95% CI = [4.88, 5.55]) than excluded participants (M = 2.23, 95% CI = [1.89, 
2.56]), t(379) =  − 12.52, p < 0.001. Thus, the manipulation was effective.
Social Needs-threat. To test the effect of the manipulation, we measured differences in the four fundamental 
needs between the included and excluded participants. Nine items were reverse scored before all items were 
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averaged into a composite “social needs” score. Cronbach’s alpha across all four needs was 0.93 (0.89 for belong-
ing, 0.84 for self-esteem, 0.90 for meaningful existence, and 0.71 for sense of control), indicating a high level of 
internal consistency. As predicted, excluded participants reported lower social needs (M = 3.01, 95% CI = [2.81, 
3.22]) than included participants (M = 5.66, 95% CI = [5.44, 5.88]), t(379) =  − 17.44, p < 0.001, confirming that 
playing the game yielded the desired effect.
Moral judgment. Normality tests revealed that one sanctity item fit the criteria for substantial  skewness20, and 
as planned in the pre-registration, was excluded from analyses. For each participant, the average moral disap-
proval rating across the five foundations was calculated, with higher scores indicating more severe condemna-
tion.
A two-way ANOVA with moral foundation (Harm, Fairness, Authority, Loyalty, and Sanctity) as a within-
subjects factor and condition (Inclusion vs. Exclusion) as a between-subjects factor showed a main effect of 
moral foundation, F(1, 379) = 79.81, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.17, with the highest condemnation for sanctity (M = 3.55, 
95% CI = [3.48, 3.62]), followed by fairness (M = 3.43, 95% CI = [3.36, 3.49]), harm (M = 3.27, 95% CI = [3.20, 
3.634]), authority (M = 3.21, 95% CI = [3.14, 3.28]), and loyalty (M = 3.06, 95% CI = [2.98, 3.14]). Contrary to 
prediction, however, the conditions did not differ, F(1, 379) = 0.02, p = 0.895, η2 = 0.00, and there was no interac-
tion between vignette type and condition, F(1, 379) = 0.542, p = 0.462, η2 = 0.00. Thus, social exclusion on its own 
did not directly increase moral condemnation.
Exploratory analyses. Social needs-threat as a possible mediator. As an exploratory analysis, we used boot-
strapping mediation  analyses21 to test whether exclusion had an indirect effect on moral judgment via thwarted 
social needs. Indeed, there is an increasing consensus that a total effect of an independent variable on a depend-
ent variable is not a necessary prerequisite for searching for evidence of indirect effects, because theoretically 
meaningful indirect effects can emerge even in the absence of statistically significant total  effects21–24.
Conditional on the assumption that exclusion increases needs-threat, and needs-threat increases moral disap-
proval, bootstrapping with 5,000 samples suggested that needs-threat mediated the relationship between exclu-
sion and moral disapproval (b = 0.16, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.27]). The confidence interval excluded zero, indicating 
that the indirect effect was significant. Figure 1 shows standardized path coefficients and Table 1 reports the 
direct and indirect effects linking moral disapproval, needs-threat, and exclusion.
Moral foundations and needs-threat. Further bootstrapping analyses examined the indirect effect of exclu-
sion on individual moral foundations via needs-threat. On the assumption of our causal model that exclu-
sion increases needs-threat, which increases moral disapproval, there was a significant indirect effect for harm 
(b = 0.21, SE = 0.07; 95% CI = 0.08 to 0.34), fairness (b = 0.19, SE = 0.06; 95% CI = 0.07 to 0.31), and sanctity 
(b = 0.15, SE = 0.07; 95% CI = 0.01 to 0.28). In contrast, although in the same direction, there were no significant 
effects for authority (b = 0.10, SE = 0.07; 95% CI =  − 0.03 to 0.23) or loyalty (b = 0.13, SE = 0.08; 95% CI =  − 0.02 
to 0.28).
Discussion. Although there was no main effect of social threat on moral judgment, an exploratory analy-
sis revealed an indirect effect based on our suggested causal pathway: Exclusion increased social needs-threat, 
Figure 1.  Indirect effect of social threat through fundamental needs-threat on moral disapproval for each 
moral foundation and across all moral violations in Study 1. Note *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Solid lines are 
significant paths. Values are standardized path coefficients.
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which in turn was associated with stronger disapproval of moral violations. When parsing by moral foundation, 
there was a significant indirect effect of social exclusion on harm, fairness, and sanctity violations but not for 
authority or loyalty violations. A possible reason for these differences between moral foundations is that the 
stimuli set from which we drew our moral vignettes found greater disapproval for harm, fairness, and sanctity 
violations, relative to authority and loyalty  violations19. Because people judge violations of harm, fairness, and 
sanctity to be particularly reprehensible, these foundations may be more sensitive to threat. Nonetheless, the 
indirect effects of social threat on both authority and loyalty violations showed trends in the same direction as 
the other foundations.
Study 2
While the indirect effect in Study 1 supported our hypothesis that social threat would amplify moral disap-
proval, this finding, along with the lack of a main effect, was unpredicted. For Study 2 we therefore conducted 
a direct replication and pre-registered our mediation model. Additionally, we included the MacArthur Ladder 
of Subjective Social  Status25 to examine whether social status may act as a moderator between exclusion and 
fundamental needs. Prior research has found that higher-status individuals show reduced perceptual attunement 
to context and experience less uncertainty in social interactions, suggesting they may be less responsive to social 
 threats26. We pre-registered two possibilities for the effect of social status: One was that the effect of exclusion 
would so powerful that it induces social threat in participants regardless of their subjective social status. Indeed, 
a meta-analysis of 120 studies showed an average effect size of d ≥ 1.40 for the Cyberball exclusion manipula-
tion, suggesting that it is highly  effective4. Another possibility is that individuals low in social status would be 
particularly responsive to exclusion and therefore needs-threat, and, as a result, more strongly condemn moral 
wrongdoers. Thus, the goal of Study 2 was to replicate the indirect effect obtained in Study 1 while also exploring 
the potential moderating effect of subjective social status.
Methods. Participants. Because the experiment was a replication of Study 1 which showed an indirect 
effect of b = 0.26 across all moral items, we used a similar sample size of 432 for a power of 0.80. Participants 
were recruited using the same eligibility criteria as in Study 1. We collected data from 444 participants to ac-
count for possible exclusion, which was applied to 16 participants due to incorrect responses to both of the two 
manipulation check items. No other participants were excluded. Our final sample consisted of 428 participants 
(250 women; age: M = 34.03 years, SD = 11.53). The inclusion condition comprised 122 women and 92 men (age: 
M = 33.67 years, SD = 11.88) and the exclusion condition comprised 128 women and 86 men (age: M = 34.38 years, 
SD = 11.19). There were no significant differences between conditions for education, t(426) =  − 0.19, p = 0.852, 
income, t(426) = 1.03, p = 0.305, or political orientation t(426) =  − 0.06, p = 0.953.
Procedure. Identical materials, measures and procedure as in Study 1 were used, with the only additions being 
measures of education, income, and political orientation, along with the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social 
 Status25, administered after participants completed the Fundamental Needs Scale. Participants were shown an 
image of a ladder with 10 rungs, and instructed to think of the top of the ladder as consisting of individuals with 
prestigious occupations, high education, and high pay, while the bottom of the ladder represented individuals 
with less prestigious occupations, less education, and low pay. They then indicated their own current standing 
Table 1.  Study 1 Regression results for the proposed mediation of the effect of exclusion on moral disapproval 
by needs-threat. Regression weights a, b, c, and c′ are illustrated in Fig. 1.  R2Y,X is the proportion of variance 
in Y explained by X,  R2M,X is the proportion of variance in M explained by X, and  R2Y,MX is the proportion of 
variance in Y explained by X and M. The 95% CI for a X b is obtained by the bias-corrected bootstrap with 
5,000 resamples. Exclusion is the independent variable (X), Needs-threat is the proposed mediator (M), and 
Moral Disapproval is the outcome (Y). CI (lower = lower bound of 95% confidence interval; CI (upper) = upper 
bound.
Model Estimate SE p CI (lower) CI (upper)
Model without proposed mediator
Intercept 3.30 .05  < .001 3.21 3.39
Exclusion → Moral Disapproval (c) −.01 .06 .895 −.13 .11
R2Y,X .00 – – – –
Model with proposed mediator
Intercept 3.63 .13  < .001 3.39 3.88
Exclusion → Needs-threat (a) 2.65 .15  < .001 2.35 2.95
Needs-threat → Moral Disapproval (b) .06 .02 .005 .02 .10
Exclusion → Moral Disapproval (c′) .15 .08 .074 −.01 .31
Indirect effect (a X b) .16 .06 – .04 .27
Standardized indirect effect (a X b) .26 .10 – .07 .45
R2M,X .45 – – – –
R2Y,MX .02 – – – –
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relative to others in the United States by selecting a rung. The pre-registration is here: http:// aspre dicted. org/ 
blind. php?x= ay4js2. We report all measures, manipulations and exclusions. The pre-registration is here: http:// 
aspre dicted. org/ blind. php?x= ay4js2. We report all measures, manipulations and exclusions.
Results. Manipulation check. Socially included participants reported a higher percentage of received throws 
during the Cyberball game (M = 37%, 95% CI = [36%, 38%]) than those who were excluded (M = 13%, 95% 
CI = [13%, 14%]), t(426) =  − 32.83, p < 0.001. Additionally, they accurately reported more inclusion in the game 
(M = 4.92, 95% CI = [4.65, 5.18]), than excluded participants (M = 1.73, 95% CI = [1.51, 1.96]), t(426) =  − 17.86, 
p < 0.001.
Social needs‑threat. The mediator variable was calculated as for Study 1. As expected, excluded participants 
reported lower social needs (M = 2.84, 95% CI = [2.68, 3.01]) than included participants (M = 5.21, 95% CI = [5.02, 
5.41]), t(379) =  − 17.44, p < 0.001. Thus, as for Study 1, the manipulation was successful.
Moral judgment. Normality tests revealed that four sanctity items were substantially  skewed19, which we had 
considered a possibility in the pre-registration, and they were therefore excluded from analyses. A two-way 
ANOVA with moral foundation (Harm, Fairness, Authority, Loyalty, and Sanctity) as within-subjects factor 
and condition (Inclusion vs. Exclusion) as a between-subjects factor showed a main effect of foundation, F(1, 
426) = 49.80, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.11, with the highest ratings for sanctity (M = 3.55, 95% CI = [3.48, 3.62]) and fair-
ness (M = 3.55, 95% CI = [3.49, 3.60]), followed by harm (M = 3.52, 95% CI = [3.46, 3.58]), authority (M = 3.41, 
95% CI = [3.35, 3.48]), and loyalty violations (M = 3.20, 95% CI = [3.13, 3.27]). The relative ordering of severity 
of ratings across foundations therefore replicated the ordering obtained in Study 1. Also in line with the results 
of Study 1, there was no main effect of condition F(1, 426) = 2.19, p = 0.14, η2 = 0.00, nor any significant two-way 
interaction between foundation and condition, F(1, 426) = 0.316, p = 0.574. Thus, we again found that social 
exclusion as a variable on its own did not directly influence moral condemnation.
Needs‑threat as a mediator. As in Study 1 and following our pre-registration, we performed a confirmatory 
analysis using  bootstrapping21 to test the proposed mediation model that needs-threat acts as a mediator for the 
relationship between exclusion and moral disapproval. Cronbach’s alpha across the four needs was 0.92 (0.85 for 
belonging, 0.82 for self-esteem, 0.88 for meaningful existence, and 0.73 for sense of control), indicating a high 
level of internal consistency. As before, we included the composite needs-threat score as the mediating variable 
in the analysis.
Replicating the key finding from Study 1 and in line with our preregistered hypothesis, 5,000 bootstrapped 
samples indicated that needs-threat mediated the relationship between exclusion and moral disapproval (b = 0.10, 
SE = 0.05; CI = 0.003 to 0.19), such that participants in the exclusion condition experienced increased needs-
threat, and as a consequence, reported higher moral disapproval ratings (see Fig. 2 for standardized path coef-
ficients, and Table 2 for direct and indirect effects).
While we chose this mediation model based on theoretical reasoning that perceived social threat is a key 
variable in amplified moral judgments, other theoretical models might also be possible. Indeed, mediation 
analyses are consistent with, but do not prove, a hypothesized causal pathway of X → M →  Y27,28. However, M 
Figure 2.  Indirect effect of social threat through fundamental needs-threat on moral disapproval for each 
moral foundation and across all moral violations in Study 2. Note *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Solid lines are 
significant paths. Values are standardized path coefficients.
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(needs-threat) was measured after X (inclusion vs. exclusion), and it was the manipulation of X that then caused 
M as has been shown in a meta-analysis of 120 Cyberball  studies4. Furthermore, M logically precedes Y (moral 
judgments): Needs-threat as a result of social exclusion occurred before the moral vignettes, which supports the 
hypothesized  ordering29.
Moral foundations and needs‑threat. Bootstrapping analyses revealed a significant indirect effect of exclusion 
on moral condemnation for harm (b = 0.11, SE = 0.05; 95% CI = 0.01 to 0.22) via needs-threat (see Fig. 2 for 
standardized path coefficients). Although the pattern was similar, effects were smaller and non-significant for 
fairness (b = 0.07, SE = 0.05; 95% CI =  − 0.03 to 0.18), sanctity (b = 0.11, SE = 0.07; 95% CI = -0.02 to 0.24), author-
ity (b = 0.10, SE = 0.06; 95% CI = -0.01 to 0.21), and loyalty (b = 0.08, SE = 0.07; 95% CI =  − 0.04 to 0.21).
Subjective social status, exclusion, and needs‑threat. We tested whether the indirect effect of exclusion on moral 
disapproval rating varied across levels of subjective social status, we used the PROCESS macro for moderated 
mediation  analysis21. The model generates bias-corrected 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for the indirect 
effects using 5,000 bootstrap samples. Subjective social status did not moderate the relationship between exclu-
sion and fundamental needs (b = 0.02, SE = 0.07, p = 0.748). Thus, the effect of exclusion on needs-threat did not 
vary with social status.
Discussion. Confirmatory analyses in Study 2 replicated the results of the exploratory analyses of Study 1, 
namely the indirect effect of social needs-threat on moral condemnation when averaging across all moral items. 
Considering each moral foundation separately, the strongest effect occurred for harm violations, as in Study 1. 
This is consistent with the notion that increased social threat gives rise to stricter judgments of those who inflict 
harm because they may pose a greater threat relative to individuals who commit other types of moral transgres-
sions. Importantly, subjective social status did not moderate the effect of social threat on fundamental needs.
Study 3
To test whether the prospect of social threat, in addition to the experience of social threat, relates to moral con-
demnation, we conducted a further correlational study. Social anxiety constitutes the “anxiety resulting from the 
prospect or presence of personal evaluation in real or imagined social situations,” and can thus be considered 
a form of social  threat30. Indeed, social anxiety results from both the possibility and the experience of social 
 exclusion31,32, and is thought to motivate the preservation or enhancement of social acceptance amongst one’s 
peers and the avoidance of behavior that could result in being  rebuffed33,34.
A commonly used scale to assess social anxiety is the Social Anxiety Questionnaire (SAQ) which assesses five 
dimensions: (1) Speaking in public/Talking with people in authority, (2) Interactions with attractive individuals 
or individuals of the opposite sex, (3) Assertive expressions of displeasure, (4) Criticism and embarrassment, 
and 5) Interactions with  strangers35. The scale has been used for both clinical and non-clinical populations, with 
good internal consistency, construct validity, and cultural  invariance36.
Based on results from Studies 1 and 2, for our third pre-registered study we hypothesized that individual 
differences in social anxiety would be associated with harsher moral judgments. In addition, we included the 
UCLA Loneliness Scale, widely used to measure the frequency of social interaction and emotions linked to 
Table 2.  Study 2 Regression results for the proposed mediation of the effect of exclusion on moral disapproval 
by needs-threat. Regression weights a, b, c, and c′ are illustrated in Fig. 2.  R2Y,X is the proportion of variance 
in Y explained by X,  R2M,X is the proportion of variance in M explained by X, and  R2Y,MX is the proportion of 
variance in Y explained by X and M. The 95% CI for a X b is obtained by the bias-corrected bootstrap with 
5,000 resamples. Exclusion is the independent variable (X), Needs-threat is the proposed mediator (M), and 
Moral Disapproval is the outcome (Y). CI (lower = lower bound of 95% confidence interval; CI (upper) = upper 
bound.
Model Estimate SE p CI (lower) CI (upper)
Model without mediator
Intercept 3.40 .04  < .001 3.33 3.48
Exclusion → Moral Disapproval (c)  − .08 .05 .140  − .19 .03
R2Y,X .01 – – – –
Model with mediator
Intercept 3.62 .11  < .001 3.40 3.83
Exclusion → Needs-threat (a) 2.37 .13  < .001 2.11 2.62
Needs-threat → Moral Disapproval (b) .04 .02 .043 .001 .08
Exclusion → Moral Disapproval (c′) .02 .07 .818  − .12 .16
Indirect effect (a X b) .10 .05 – .005 .19
Standardized indirect effect (a X b) .17 .09 – .009 .34
R2M,X .44 – – – –
R2Y,MX .02 – – – –
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 loneliness37. We chose this scale to determine whether moral judgments are associated more with social threat 
(= social anxiety), or social lack (= loneliness) in an effort to add convergent validity to our hypothesis. Finally, 
we again included the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status to test whether social status is associated with 
moral judgments, and to whether it acts as a moderator between social anxiety and moral judgment or loneli-
ness and moral judgment.
Methods. Participants. We recruited participants as in Studies 1 and 2. A G*Power analysis with 80% pow-
er at α = 0.05 to obtain an effect size of r = 0.30 suggested a sample size of 84. We collected data from 104 partici-
pants to account for the possibility of some participants providing unusable data. We excluded two participants 
for failing both of the two attention check items in one of the study questionnaires. Our final sample consisted of 
102 participants (50 women; age: M = 33.20 years, SD = 10.35).
Social anxiety questionnaire. The SAQ is a 30-item instrument in which participants rate their unease, stress, 
or nervousness in different social situations on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely high). Sample items 
include “Greeting each person at a social meeting when I don’t know most of them” and “Telling someone I am 
attracted to that I would like to get to know them better.” It also contains two attention check items, including 
“Being mugged or robbed by an armed gang.” As recommended by the SAQ creators, we removed participants 
who selected “1” or “2” on both of the attention check  items35.
UCLA loneliness scale. UCLA Loneliness Scale, Version 3 is a widely used 20-item loneliness assessment  tool37. 
Sample questions include “How often do you feel that you are ‘in tune’ with the people around you?” and “How 
often do you feel alone?” Items were reverse-scored when necessary.
Moral judgment. We used the same vignettes as in Studies 1 and 2. Participants completed them first, and then 
received the two questionnaires in a counterbalanced order. The pre-registration is here: http:// aspre dicted. org/ 
blind. php?x= 8t4zj3, We report all measures, manipulations and exclusions. The pre-registration is here: http:// 
aspre dicted. org/ blind. php?x= 8t4zj3, We report all measures, manipulations and exclusions.
Results. We excluded one sanctity item, as it was substantially  skewed20, and then conducted correlational 
analyses between the scales. Social anxiety scores were normally distributed, with a skewness of 0.07 (SE = 0.24) 
and kurtosis of − 0.39 (SE = 0.47). Loneliness scores were normally distributed, with a skewness of − 0.07 
(SE = 0.24) and kurtosis of 0.53 (SE = 0.47).
Social anxiety. There was a significant correlation, r(102) = 0.43, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.26, 0.58]) between social 
anxiety and moral condemnation across all items (see Fig. 3 for scatterplot). Results were significant for harm 
(95% CI = [0.20, 0.53]), fairness (95% CI = [0.19, 0.53]), authority (95% CI = [0.24, 0.56]), loyalty (95% CI = [0.25, 
Figure 3.  Scatterplot for Social Anxiety and Moral Disapproval for Study 3.
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0.57]), and sanctity (95% CI = [0.06, 0.42]). Thus, the association between social anxiety and moral condemna-
tion held across all moral items, and for each individual moral foundation (see Table 3 for correlations between 
social anxiety and moral foundation).
Loneliness. No significant correlation was observed for moral condemnation across all items, 95% CI = [−0.21, 
0.18]), nor for any of the individual foundations, all ps > 0.372.
Social anxiety and loneliness. A hierarchical multiple regression was run to determine if the addition of loneli-
ness improved the prediction of moral disapproval over and above social anxiety alone. There was no significant 
increase in  R2, F(1, 99) = 1.288, p = 0.259. Thus, while social anxiety had a positive relationship with moral disap-
proval, including loneliness did not explain any further variance. Indeed, the correlation between the two vari-
ables was relatively low (r = 0.20), indicating that they indeed capture different underlying constructs.
Subjective social status. No significant correlation was observed for moral disapproval across all items, r = 0.06, 
p = 0.528, (95% CI = [−0.14, 0.27]), nor for any of the individual foundations, all ps > 0.131.
 Social anxiety and subjective social status. Subjective social status was tested as a potential moderator between 
social anxiety and moral condemnation. Subjective social status did not moderate the relationship between 
social anxiety and moral condemnation (b = 0.00, SE = 0.00, p = 0.208). Thus, the association between social anxi-
ety and moral condemnation did not vary with social status.
Subjective social status and loneliness. Similarly, subjective social status did not moderate the relationship 
between loneliness and moral condemnation (b = 0.00, SE = 0.00, p = 0.449.
Discussion. As predicted in our pre-registration, social anxiety was correlated with moral disapproval at 
r = 0.43, considered to be a large effect  size38. Furthermore, social anxiety had a similar association with all moral 
foundations violations. In contrast, we found no link between loneliness and moral disapproval ratings, implying 
that social threat, rather than social lack, is associated with harsher moral judgments. Furthermore, subjective 
social status was not correlated with moral judgment, nor did it moderate the associations between social anxiety 
and moral judgment or loneliness and moral judgment.
General discussion
Taken together, findings from three pre-registered studies suggest that challenges to one’s social needs is associ-
ated with increased sensitivity to moral violations. Experimental evidence from Studies 1 and 2 suggests that 
exclusion activates social threat by thwarting fundamental social needs, which in turn was associated with harsher 
condemnation for moral wrongdoers. Separating by moral foundation, results revealed the most pronounced 
effect for harm violations, relative to fairness, authority, loyalty, and sanctity violations. Study 3 examined whether 
individual differences in social threat and loneliness would be associated with harsher moral judgments. While 
social anxiety was positively correlated with moral condemnation, loneliness was not, suggesting that social 
threat, rather than the absence of social connection, is associated with amplified moral condemnation.
These findings indicating that social threat is associated with harsher moral judgments suggest that various 
threats to survival can influence assessments of moral wrongdoing. Indeed, it has been proposed that the reason 
social exclusion reliably results in negative emotions is because social disconnectedness has been detrimental 
throughout human  societies6,7,9–11. As we found in Studies 1 and 2 and consistent with prior  research4,5, even 
brief exclusion via a simulated computer game can thwart fundamental social needs. Taken together, these 
experimental and correlational findings suggest that an elevated sense of danger appears to fortify moral judg-
ment, because when safety is compromised, wrongdoers represent yet another source of potential danger. As a 
consequence, vulnerable individuals may be motivated to condemn moral violations more harshly. Interestingly, 
the null finding for loneliness suggests that amplified moral condemnation is not associated with having no social 
connections in the first place, but rather, with the existence or prospect of social threat. Relatedly, prior research 
Table 3.  Correlations among variables for Study 3. N = 102. *p < .05; **p  ≤ .01; ***p  ≤ .001.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Social Anxiety
2 Loneliness .20*
3 All MFVs .43***  − .01
4 Harm .38*** .01 .86***
5 Fairness .37***  − .09 .88*** .80***
6 Authority .41***  − .05 .90*** .67*** .74***
7 Loyalty .42*** .03 .84*** .57*** .60*** .81***
8 Sanctity .25* .04 .78*** .64*** .62*** .59*** .53***
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has shown that greater cortisol release is associated with social anxiety but not with  loneliness7,39 indicating that 
the body’s stress response does not react to loneliness in the same way as it does to social threat.
There are limitations within these findings. For example, though we replicated our results, there are pos-
sible factors that limit the benefits of using MTurk for data collection. MTurk is by far the most frequently used 
online data collection  platform40 and contains a large and diverse participant  pool41. Nevertheless, researchers 
have described its challenges, including  inattention42, non-naïveté43, and vulnerability to “bots”44. To mitigate 
the possibility of low data quality, we adhered to recommended  guidelines45 and recruited only MTurkers with 
an approval rating of at least 95%, and we included manipulation checks in Studies 1 and 2 and attention checks 
in Study 3.
Considering the implications of our results, we may speculate that the positive association between social 
threat and moral judgment is one reason why online moral outrage has recently  intensified46. Expressing moral 
outrage can benefit society by holding wrongdoers accountable and broadcasting to others that such behavior is 
unacceptable. However, online settings might encourage a “piling on” effect, such that observers of a transgres-
sion may not consider proportionality when condemning the  wrongdoer47,48. Social media facilitates frictionless 
reprobation, and as each additional individual contributes to public reprimand, the cumulative effect might be, 
depending on the transgression committed, greater than what the wrongdoer deserves. Along these lines, there 
is suggestive evidence that the desire the punish others makes them appear less  human49. Social media might, 
by exacerbating moral outrage, intensify dehumanization of the target of disapproval. Lastly, expressing moral 
outrage may result in less involvement in social causes. Research on the moral licensing effect, for example, 
suggests that people implicitly monitor their moral value, and, once they have done something good, they later 
feel license to forego engaging in additional helpful  behaviors50,51. Relatedly, when given the chance to express 
outrage with written messages, people are less likely to spend money to promote fair  behavior52.
Internet-users often experience a relentless sense of social threat because social media content encourages 
upward social comparison, which might make them feel inferior to their  peers53. At the same time, they often 
witness transgressions because social media is optimized to elicit moral  outrage54. For example, people may feel 
socially unpopular when scrolling through social media profiles, and then, when learning about an infraction, 
express greater moral outrage than had they not experienced the erstwhile social threat. Thus, the combination of 
online activities of comparing oneself to others, along with reading news stories and social media posts designed 
to prompt moral outrage, may contribute to the current level of online vitriol.
On a more positive note, the current findings suggest that reducing the experience of social threat may be 
one way to curb excessive moral outrage. Indeed, prior research has found that moral judgment can be attenu-
ated. Pharmacologically inhibiting disgust, for example, has been shown to reduce moral condemnation for 
sanctity  violations55. Perhaps, in a similar manner, inhibiting social threat could reduce moral outrage. A possible 
approach could be to remind people of their supportive social relationships when they are experiencing social 
threat. For instance, earlier work has shown that reminders of positive social contacts moderate the perception 
of physical obstacles such that they appear less formidable, relative to reminders of neutral or negative social 
 contacts56. Likewise, positive social contact may attenuate the effect of social threats. In short, if social threat 
exacerbates moral condemnation, bolstering social bonds could curb it.
Data availability
Preregistrations for all three studies can be accessed at http:// aspre dicted. org/ blind. php?x= pu9xy2; http:// aspre 
dicted. org/ blind. php?x= ay4js2, and http:// aspre dicted. org/ blind. php?x= 8t4zj3. All data are openly available on 
the following website https:// osf. io/ yjd37/? view_ only= c62a7 29b4c b44db f88c0 78b13 a7b51 af.
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